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THE CONTINUING DEBATE OVER TORT DUTY IN
NEW MEXICO: THE ROLE OF FORESEEABILITY AND
POLICY IN HERRERA V. QUALITY PONTIAC
QUINN M. BUMGARNER-KIRBY
I. INTRODUCTION
In Herrerav. Quality Pontiac,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a car
dealership owed a duty of care to victims who were injured in an accident caused
by the driver of a car stolen from the dealership,2 because harm to the victims was
foreseeable, 3 and because the adoption of comparative fault in New Mexico
provided policy support for imposing a duty.4 The case caused a substantial public
uproar. Following several newspaper reports,5 readers wrote letters to the editor
decrying the supreme court's "titanic ignorance"6 and opining that "courts need to
stop deferring responsibility from the criminal and judges need to grow a backbone
and do their job."7 This casenote shows that while Herrera made significant
changes to New Mexico tort law, the changes are not as drastic as public opinion
might suggest.
This Note demonstrates how the Herreracourt expanded existing concepts of
duty, but did so within the same framework used by past cases. This Note begins by
contextualizing Herrera through an examination of Calkins v. Cox Estates8 and
Torres v. State,9 two of the foundational New Mexico cases on negligence duty. It
shows how Herreraexamined the same two factors considered by those cases: the
foreseeability of injury to the particular plaintiff and the question of whether New
Mexico policy supports the imposition of a duty. This Note argues that the Herrera
court changed the method of analysis for these two factors by relaxing the policy
standard necessary for a finding of duty, and by shifting the balance of power with
respect to foreseeability away from juries and back to the courts. Finally, this Note
suggests how Herrera may be used to further expand duty in future third-party
tortfeasor cases, proposes possible methods for distinguishing the case from similar
factual situations, and examines whether New Mexico should eliminate foreseeability from the tort duty analysis.
* Class of 2005, University of New Mexico School of Law. Thanks to Professor Ted Occhialino for his
great insights and his patience and enthusiasm. Special thanks to my partner, Jenny Dumas, for engaging in
endless, circular discussions of tort law with me, and for being the best ever.
1. 2003-NMSC-018, 73 P.3d 181.
2. Id. 1 1-5, 73 P.3d at 184-85.
3. Id. 1 24, 73 P.3d at 192.
4. Id. ii 28-29, 73 P.3d at 193-94.
5. See, e.g., Scott Sandlin, Key in Car? You May Be Liable, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 28, 2003, at Al;
Deborah Baker, Court: DealerLiable in Stolen CarFatality, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 18, 2003, at B5.
6. Randall Mix, Letter to the Editor, Supreme Court Asleep at Wheel, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 2,2003, at
A13.
7. Kevin J. Fristensky, Letter to the Editor, Responsibility Thing of the Past?, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 2,
2003, at A13. Several of the letter writers apparently did not understand that the decision did not hold Quality
Pontiac liable, and that it only opened the door for civil, rather than criminal, liability. For example, one writer
asked, "Should I break into a judge's home and steal a gun with which I later commit murder, does the judge go
to prison with me?" Randall Mix, Letter to the Editor, Supreme CourtAsleep at Wheel, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 2,
2003, at A13.
8. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36(1990).
9. 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (1995).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Herrera v. Quality Pontiac0 arose out of an auto accident caused by Billy
Garcia, a man who stole a car from the Quality Pontiac dealership and subsequently
collided with the plaintiffs' vehicle, injuring one occupant and killing the other."l
The plaintiffs, Kenneth Herrera (the personal representative of Octavio Ruiz) and
Jose Encinias alleged the following facts. 12 On May 27, 1996, a car owner took his
car to Quality Pontiac for repairs. 3 Quality Pontiac told the owner to leave the car
parked in the lot, unlocked, and with the keys in the ignition. n Although the lot was
fenced, the gate was left unlocked," and that night Billy Garcia entered the lot and
stole the car.' 6 The next morning, a police officer attempted to pull Garcia over
while he was driving the stolen vehicle, 17 and a high-speed chase ensued.' 8 While
fleeing from the police, Garcia collided head on with Ruiz and Encinias, who had
pulled over onto the shoulder after hearing the police sirens.' 9 The collision killed
Ruiz and injured Encinias.2 °
Herrera and Encinias sued Quality Pontiac, alleging that Quality Pontiac owed
them a duty, and that the dealership's negligence in leaving the car in the condition
in which it was stolen was a proximate cause of their injuries. 21 To support their
allegations, Herrera and Encinias presented an expert affidavit that provided
statistics on car theft.22 The expert affidavit stated that Albuquerque had the second
highest rate of auto theft in the nation, and that forty-five percent to eighty percent
of cars that were stolen had been left unlocked. 23 Between nineteen percent and
forty-seven percent of these cars, the expert said, had been left with the keys
inside.24 The expert also cited a study showing that nearly seventeen percent of
vehicles that are stolen are involved in accidents, a rate that is nearly 200 times the
accident rate for non-stolen cars. 2' The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted.26 Without issuing an opinion, the court of appeals certified the case to the

10. 2003-NMSC-018, 73 P.3d 181.
11. Id. " 1-2, 73 P.3d at 184-85.
12. Id. 1 1, 73 P.3d at 184-85.
13. Id. 12,73 P.3d at 185.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20. Id.
21.

Id.

22. Id. 3, 73 P.3d at 185.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.1 1, 73 P.3d at 185.
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New Mexico Supreme Court,27 which reversed the dismissal, concluding that
Quality Pontiac owed a duty to Ruiz and Encinias.28
Ill. BACKGROUND
The law of negligence duty in New Mexico has evolved a great deal over the past
few decades, often resting on "shifting sands, 29 and having "no fit foundation."3 °
The starting point for a discussion of tort duty3' is the seminal case of Palsgrafv.
Long Island Railroad Co.32 In Palsgraf,employees of the defendant railroad
company helped a man to board an already-moving train, causing him to drop a
package that unexpectedly contained fireworks, which exploded when dropped.33
The explosion caused a set of scales to fall and injure Mrs. Palsgraf, who was
standing at the other end of the platform.34 Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority,
held that the railroad did not owe a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf, because injury to her was
not a foreseeable result of the negligent act.33 In dissent, Judge Andrews argued that
every person owes a duty of reasonable care to the world at large, regardless of
whether harm to the injured party was foreseeable.36 These two views have become
the cornerstones of tort duty jurisprudence.37
In the 1983 case Ramirez v. Armstrong,as the New Mexico Supreme Court
signaled that our state would side with Judge Cardozo and require that harm to a
particular plaintiff be foreseeable if a duty is to be owed: "If it is found that a
plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff,were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that
plaintiff by the defendant., 39 Seven years later, in Calkins v. Cox Estates,' the New

27. Id.; see NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(C) (2003) ("The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction in matters
appealed to the court of appeals, but undecided by that court, if the court of appeals certifies to the supreme court
that the matter involves: (1) a significant question of law under the constitution of New Mexico or the United
States; or (2) an issue of substantial public interest that should-be determined by the supreme court.").
28.

Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,

5, 73 P.3d at 185.

29. Id.1 42, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring) (quoting William L. Prosser, Palsgraf
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (1953)).

30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Prosser, supranote 29, at 1 ("Perhaps the most celebrated of all tort cases is Palsgrafv. Long
Island RailroadCompany.").

32. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
33. Id.at 99.
34. Id.
35.

Id. at 101.

36. Id.at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., The Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing InstitutionalMemories: Wisconsin and
the American Law Institute: The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1, 26 ("Palsgrafisgenerally recognized as

the most famous (though not necessarily the most important) tort case of all time and it continues to be cited in
judicial decisions.") (citation omitted).
38. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983), overruled on othergrounds by Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 797

P.2d 246 (1990).
39.

Id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 (emphasis added). In Ramirez, the New Mexico Supreme Court first

recognized a cause of action for bystander recovery by a plaintiff who has not suffered any physical injury. Id.
at
540-41, 673 P.2d at 824-25. In deciding which of the tests adopted by other jurisdictions was best suited to
existing New Mexico law, the court cited Palsgraf,which it interpreted as holding that, "[i]f it is found that a
plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant." Id.
This sentence has been quoted extensively in subsequent cases, see, e.g., Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,

7, 73 P.3d at 186; Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 569, 829 P.2d 645, 648 (1992); Klopp v.
Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 158, 824 P.2d 293, 298 (1992); Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 62, 792
P.2d 36, 39 (1990), and is generally recognized as the case in which the court adopted the "foreseeable plaintiff'

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

Mexico Supreme Court elaborated on Ramirez, setting forth a two-part test for duty:
a plaintiff must show, first, that New Mexico policy supports the imposition of a
duty, 4' and second, that injury to that plaintiff was a foreseeable result of the
defendant's negligence.42
In Calkins, an eight-year-old resident of the defendant's apartment complex
climbed through a hole in a fence surrounding the complex's playground, crossed
an arroyo, and traveled more than 900 feet to the frontage road where he was hit by
a car and killed. 43 Reversing the lower courts, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled
that the landlord owed a duty to the child."4
The Calkins court began by reciting the foreseeable plaintiff test set forth in
Ramirez: "If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable,
then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant. 45 The court held that trial
judges are to rule on foreseeability as a matter of law by determining whether the
plaintiff was "within the zone of danger created by [the defendant's] actions."' The
court clarified, however, that duty is also a matter of policy-courts should
determine whether established state policies support the imposition of a duty by
examining "legal precedent, statutes, and other principles comprising the law. 47
In a footnote, the court explained that there are two types of duty: (1) an
"affirmative" duty, which is created when a specific statutory or common law
principle imposes a specific standard of care on a defendant with respect to a

test for determining duty in a negligence action. See, e.g., Nancy Desiderio, Tort Law-Evolution of Duty in New
Mexico: Torres v. State, 26 N.M. L. REV. 585, 588 (1996); Solon, 113 N.M. at 569, 829 P.3d at 648 ("[despite
this Court's adoption in Ramirez of the Palsgrafdoctrine....").
This development is remarkable because Ramirez was a bystander recovery action, not a standard
negligence action. In fact, it is doubtful that the Ramirez court really intended to announce a new duty rule. First,
the court gave no rationale for adopting the foreseeable plaintiff test, as one would expect it to do had it really
intended to make such a major statement on New Mexico tort law. Second, it was not necessary for the court to
articulate the Palsgrafforeseeable plaintiff test. Because the test for bystander recovery that the court adopted
encompasses foreseeability by requiring that the plaintiff have a close, familial relationship with the victim, as well
as a contemporaneous sensory perception of the event, Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26 (citing
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)), a separate foreseeability analysis would be redundant. Lastly, negligent
infliction of emotional distress is a separate cause of action from personal-injury negligence and raises concerns
of liability for injuries that are arguably less direct and identifiable than physical injuries. See, e.g., Karen L.
Chadwick, Fearof AIDS: The Catalyst for Expanding Judicial Recognition of a Duty to Prevent Emotional
Distress Beyond TraditionalBounds, 25 N.M.L. REV. 143, 144-45 (1995) ("The distrust of such claims has been
based on a pervasive suspicion that claims for emotional distress-without more-are trivial, difficult to prove and
thus not an appropriate use ofjudicial resources."). Because of the differences between these two causes of action,
it might not be necessary or preferable to formulate the duty analysis in the same way for both.
Of course, the question of what the Ramirez court intended is largely moot now, because it is firmly
established that New Mexico requires a plaintiff to be foreseeable in order to recover. See, e.g., Calkins, 110 N.M.
at 61,792 P.2d at 38. But from an historical standpoint, Ramirez is perhaps most remarkable for what it does not
say. The court's failure to elaborate on the foreseeable plaintiff test, and its failure to provide support for its
decision to adopt the test, if it did in fact intend to do so, may have precipitated the confusion with respect to duty
that has occurred in subsequent cases.
40. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990).
41. Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39 (quoting Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825).
46. Id. at 61,792 P.2d at 38.
47. Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
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specific individual or group of individuals, 48 and (2) a "defensive" duty, which is
created by the "general negligence standard"-that a defendant must exercise
ordinary care in all of his or her activities. 49 Foreseeability of the plaintiff, the court
said, is a prerequisite to an ultimate finding of either type of duty." The court then
directed judges to balance three additional policy factors: (1) the parties'
relationship, (2) the interests of the plaintiff that have been injured, and (3) the
conduct of the defendant." The court did not specify whether these factors are to
be considered in all policy analyses, or only in defensive duty policy analyses. 2
The Calkins court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the defendant owed a
"defensive" duty,5 3 holding instead that it was unnecessary to reach that question,
because New Mexico law supported the imposition of an "affirmative" duty.54 The
court relied on a New Mexico statute, which imposed a duty on a landlord to
maintain, "in a reasonably safe condition, areas that expressly or impliedly are
reserved for the common use of some or all of his tenants. 55 The court held that the
statute created a duty, because the playground had been reserved for tenant use.56
Finally, the court found that the foreseeability prong of the duty test was also met:
the boy was a foreseeable plaintiff because the landlord knew that children played
at the playground, and because, as a tenant, the boy was "foreseeably playing"
there. 7
Justice Ransom dissented. 8 He believed that if policy considerations would make
imposing a duty unreasonable, then there should be no duty even if the plaintiff was
foreseeable. 9 Foreseeability, Justice Ransom said, is a question of fact that should
not be part of the duty analysis, absent circumstances where it is a "false jury
issue." 6 He concluded that no duty was owed as a matter of policy, because it was

48. Id. at 62 n.l, 792 P.2d at 39 n..
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 63,792 P.2d at 40. The court further noted that, ifprior cases have established a duty arising under
a particular set of circumstances, this balancing test has already been performed and should not be repeated. Id.
52. See infra note 65.
53. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 62-63, 792 P.2d at 39-40.
54. Id. at 63, 792 P.2d at 40.
55. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 47-8-20(A)(3) (1989)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 65, 792 P.2d at 42.
58. Id. at 66-68, 792 P.2d at 43-45 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting). Justice Ransom argued that policy was the most
important consideration, and that the policy consideration of "remoteness" should be the deciding factor. Id.
(Ransom, J., dissenting). Using the language of Judge Andrews, the dissenter in Palsgraf,Justice Ransom defined
the remoteness doctrine as follows: "[B]ecause of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily [decides whether] to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics." Id. (Ransom, J., dissenting) (quoting Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original)). Interestingly, Judge Andrews was discussing proximate cause in this passage. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 103
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
60. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting). Justice Ransom was referring to a
circumstance in which a court could rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff was unforeseeable, because reasonable
minds could not disagree on the issue. Id. "Reasonable minds could not disagree" is the general standard under
which a question of fact may be removed from the jury and decided as a matter of law. See Melnick v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726, 728, 749 P.2d 1105, 1107 (1988).
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"simply not reasonable to require a landlord to restrain a third or fourth grade boy
from leaving his apartment complex."'"
While the Calkins framework may be confusing, the analysis seems to proceed
as follows. First, a court should examine statutes and case law to see whether the
defendant owes an affirmative duty.62 If a statute or prior case provides explicit
support for either imposing or declining to impose a duty, the policy analysis
stops.63 If, however, no statute or case answers the question, the court should
proceed to examine the other three factors (the parties' relationship, the interests of
the plaintiff that have been injured, and the conduct of the defendant)' to see if the
defendant can be said to owe a general negligence or defensive duty to the
plaintiff. 65 If a court finds policy reasons to support either an affirmative or a
defensive duty, it should proceed to the final step, a determination of whether the
plaintiff was foreseeable.66 Ultimately, Calkins established that New Mexico has
sided with Judge Cardozo and adopted the foreseeable plaintiff test for duty, and
that foreseeability alone does not trigger duty. After Calkins, courts were to
determine, as a matter of law, whether the plaintiff was foreseeable, and whether
public policy supported the imposition of a duty.
New Mexico courts used the Calkins framework for several years, until 1995
when the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Torres v. State,67 departed from Calkins
by holding that foreseeability should ordinarily be a factual question for the jury.68
Torres was a wrongful death action stemming from an incident where a gunman
killed three people at an Albuquerque bagel shop.69 Through a series of alleged
miscommunications, the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) and the New
Mexico Department of Public Safety (DPS) failed to apprehend the gunman when
they allegedly could have.7" Shortly after the bagel shop killings, the gunman fled
to California, where he killed two more men.7' The plaintiffs (personal
representatives of the California victims) alleged that APD was negligent in failing
to exercise ordinary care in investigating the Albuquerque murders, proximately

61. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 68, 792 P.2d at 45 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
63. Id. at 63, 792 P.2d at 40.
64. Id.

65. The factors comprising this second policy test are arguably dicta, because, finding an affirmative duty,
the court found it unnecessary to proceed to an examination of defensive duty. Additionally, the court's language
in articulating the second test could support the interpretation that the test should be used in both types of policy
analysis (affirmative and defensive). However, given the contexts of both policy tests, the argument seems stronger
that the first test is to be used only in the affirmative duty analysis, while the second should be used primarily in
the defensive duty analysis. This framework is consistent with what commentators have referred to as "legal" policy
and "social" policy, see Desiderio, supranote 39, at 598-99, and with the court's later statement in Torres v. State
that "[c]ourts should make policy in order to determine duty only when the body politic has not spoken ....119
N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995).

66. See Calkins, 110 N.M. at 65, 792 P.2d at 42. The policy question should probably be addressed first,
because after finding that policy supported imposing a duty, the court said, "he legal question of duty for the court
to decide then becomes whether the plaintiff in a case may foreseeably be injured by a breach of the duty." Id.
(emphasis added).
67.

119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (1995).

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
Id. at 611, 894 P.2d at 388.
Id.
Id.
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causing the deaths of the California victims.72 The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint, holding that APD and DPS owed no duty to the California
victims because they were not foreseeable plaintiffs.73 The court of appeals affirmed
on policy grounds.74 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that APD
and DPS owed a duty of care to all victims foreseeably at risk, and remanded the
case for a jury to determine whether the plaintiffs were in fact foreseeable. 75 The
court began by stating:
Policy determines duty ....
[I]t is the particular domain of the legislature, as the
voice of the people, to make public policy....The judiciary, however, is not as
directly and politically responsible to the people as are the legislative and
executive branches of the government. Courts should make policy in order to
determine duty only when the body politic has not spoken and only with the
understanding that any misperception of the public mind may be corrected
shortly by the legislature.76
In keeping with this statement, the court said that it was inappropriate for the
court of appeals to have conducted its own policy analysis, because the legislature
had already spoken.77 The court of appeals had based its decision on the arguably
compelling policy rationale that imposing a duty in this case would be "unrealistic
in light of rising criminal activity and limited public resources. 7 8 The supreme
court noted, however, that the legislature had "imposed on law enforcement officers
a duty to investigate crimes called to their attention, 79 and New Mexico case law
had established that when an officer negligently breaches that duty, the Tort Claims
Act allows plaintiffs to sue.80 Because the legislature had already imposed a duty,
it was not necessary for a court to conduct any further policy analysis-it was only
necessary to examine the complaint for any provable set of facts that would show
a breach of that duty as to "persons foreseeably at risk."'"
The court further held that "[floreseeability is a question of law when a court, in
reviewing whether a duty exists, can determine that the victim was unforeseeable
to any reasonable mind. 82 Absent unforeseeability as a matter of law, the court
said, the question is for a jury to decide.83 The court determined that, because the

72. Id. at 611-12, 894 P.2d at 388-89.
73. Id. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.

74. Torres v. State, 116 N.M. 379, 862 P.2d 1238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
75. Torres, 119 N.M. at 616, 894 P.2d at 393.
76. Id. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
77. Id. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
78. Id. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389 (quoting Torres, 116 N.M. at 384, 862 P.2d at 1243).
79. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 29-1-1 (1994)).
80. Id. (citing Schear v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671,676,687 P.2d 728,733 (1984); Cal. First
Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646 (1990)).
81. Id. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 614, 894 P.2d at 391.
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plaintiffs were not unforeseeable as a matter of law," it would be for a jury to
decide whether they were in fact persons foreseeably at risk. 5
86
The court's policy analysis served to reinforce and clarify the Calkins holding.
However, the court's statement that foreseeability is a jury question unless it is
absent as a matter of law represented a major departure from Calkins, which had
held that foreseeability of the plaintiff was always a question for the court.8 7
Because Torres did not signal that it was making a change in the law, a reader who
was unfamiliar with Calkins would not be aware that a change was occurring.
Moreover, although the holdings on who is to decide foreseeability are in direct
opposition, the Torres court did not overrule Calkins. Thus, after Torres, both
methods for determining foreseeability were arguably still available.
IV. RATIONALE
After stating the facts and history of the case,8 8 the Herrera court set forth
general principles of duty from prior cases.89 Quoting Ramirez, the court stated that,
"[i]f it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then
a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant."9 ° But, the court said,
foreseeability alone does not "end the inquiry," 9' because "[plolicy determines
be made with reference to
duty. '92 This policy determination, the court said, is to 93
law."
of
principles
other
and
statutes,
precedent,
"legal
Next, the court distinguished foreseeability in the context of duty from
foreseeability in the context of proximate cause.94 The former, the court said, is a
question of law for the court to determine using policy, and the latter is a question
of fact to be determined by the fact finder. 95 The court quoted a Florida case,
McCain v. FloridaPower Corp.,96 which explained the distinction as follows: a

84. Citing the ease of interstate travel, and the likelihood that a murderer who has killed at random will do
so again, the court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs were "so removed from the alleged
wrongful conduct that they were unforeseeable as a matter of law." Id.
85. Id. at 614, 894 P.2d at 391.
86. The Torres mandate that courts must first look to legislative policy, and should subsequently conduct
their own policy analyses only if no statutory support has been found, clarifies the proper analysis of affirmative
and defensive duty under Calkins: courts should first look for an affirmative duty, using established state policies.
Then, only after having done so, should they proceed to analyze defensive duty, using the other three policy factors.
See supranotes 62-66 and accompanying text.
87. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 65, 792 P.2d at 42 ("The legal question of duty for the court to decide then
becomes whether the plaintiff in a case may foreseeably be injured by a breach of the duty."). Although the Torres
court cited to Calkins,it did so in order to promulgate a rule that actually conflicts with Calkins. In fact, the Calkins
court decided that the plaintiff in that case wasforeseeable, a holding that would never be reached under the Torres
formulation. A court ruling in accordance with Torres could only decide whether a plaintiff was unforeseeable as
a matter of law. If the plaintiff was unforeseeable as a matter of law, then the court would hold that no duty was
owed. If the plaintiff was not unforeseeable as a matter of law, the question would be sent to the jury.
1-5, 73 P.3d at 184-85.
88. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,
89. Id. U9 6-10, 73 P.3d at 186-87.
90. Id. 7, 73 P.3d at 186 (quoting Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825).
91. Id. (quoting Lester ex rel. Mavrogenis v. Hall, 1998-NMSC-047, 9, 970 P.2d 590, 593).
92. Id. (quoting Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389).
93. Id. (quoting Ruiz v. Garcia, 115 N.M. 269, 272, 850 P.2d 972, 975 (1993)).
94. Id. 1 8, 73 P.3d at 186.
95. Id. (quoting Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38).
96. 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992).
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duty is owed when a plaintiff "open[s] the courthouse doors"97 by satisfying the
"minimal threshold legal requirement" 98 of showing that a defendant's conduct has
"foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that poses a general threat of harm to
others." 99 In contrast, proximate cause is a factual showing that a plaintiff must
make "once the courthouse doors are open,' requiring proof that "the defendant's
conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually
occurred."'' The court recognized that "there is nothing sacred about 'duty,' which
is nothing more than a word, and a very indefinite one, with which we state our
conclusion."° 2
The court summed up the foreseeability analysis in duty as follows: "[I]t must be
determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff-that he [or she] was
within the zone of danger created by [the defendant's] actions[--]...as a matter of
law by thejudge, using established legal policy.... "" The ultimate goal of the duty
analysis, the court concluded, is to ask whether the defendant has an obligation to
the plaintiff to which the law "will give legal effect and recognition,"'" a question
that is to be answered "as a matter of policy as well as foreseeability."'' 5
The plaintiffs argued that the defendant owed them a duty under a New Mexico
statute, which stated that
[n]o person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand
unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the
key and effectively setting the brake, or placing the transmission in parking
position, thereon and, when standing upon any grade, turning the front wheels
in such a manner that the vehicle will be held by the curb or will leave the
highway if the brake fails."°
The statute also contained the following provision:
A violation of this section shall not mitigate the offense of stealing a motor
vehicle, nor shall the provisions of this section or any violation thereof be
admissible as evidence in a civil action for the recovery of a stolen vehicle, or
in any other civil action arising out of the theft of a motor vehicle."
Relying on Torres, the court acknowledged that statements of legislative policy
are always the proper starting point for a duty analysis. 08 The court reasoned that
the purpose of the statute was to "protect the welfare and safety of the public,"' 0 9
and described the statute's primary goal as "prevent[ing] acts which could lead to
97. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 8, 73 P.3d at 186 (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502 (citations omitted
in original) (first alteration in original)).
98. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502).
99. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502).
100. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502).
101. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502).
102. Id. 9, 73 P.3d at 186-87 (quoting Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825).
103. Id. 1 10, 73 P.3d at 187 (quoting Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38 (all alterations in original)).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. 111, 73 P.3d at 187 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 66-7-353 (1978)).
Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 66-7-353 (1978)).
Id. (quoting Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389).
Id. 1 12, 73 P.3d at 187.
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an automobile inadvertently moving without intention that it should." " 0 But given
the provision requiring removal of the keys from the ignition, the court also
believed that the statute "implicitly contain[ed] a policy to deter theft."'" However,
since the statute explicitly stated that a violation would be inadmissible as evidence
in any civil action arising out of a car theft, the court held that it did not evidence
a "legislative intent to create a duty." ' 1 2 The court noted that a minority of
jurisdictions with similar statutes had held that the statutes created a tort duty, "t3 but
the court declined to follow those jurisdictions." 4
Having concluded that the statute relied upon by the plaintiffs did not create a
statutory duty, the court went on to examine whether a common law duty could be
imposed." 15 It justified this venture beyond the bounds of statutory authority by
quoting Torres: "Courts should make policy to determine duty only when the body
politic has not spoken and only with the understanding that any misperception of
the public mind may be corrected shortly by the [L]egislature.""' 16
In order to find that a common law duty was owed, the court first had to overrule
Bouldin v. Sategna,"7 a New Mexico case from the 1960s that had refused to allow
liability under circumstances very similar to those present in Herrera.The Bouldin
defendant had left his car at a tavern, unattended, and with the keys in the ignition.1 8 An unknown thief stole the car and abandoned it in the middle of the road,
where the plaintiff collided with it." 9 In overruling Bouldin, the court reasoned that
the adoption of comparative fault and the increase in car theft and related auto
accidents constituted changes22 in law 120 and fact, 12 ' respectively, that merited a
departure from stare decisis.1

110. Id. (quoting Bouldin v. Sategna, 71 N.M. 329, 332, 378 P.2d 370, 372 (1963)).
111. Id. (citing Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 107 N.M. 688,701,763 P.2d 1153, 1166 (1988),
limited on other grounds by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 965 P.2d 305).
112. Id. The court also noted that the statute was intended to govern "vehicles on highways," id. (citing
NMSA 1978, § 66-7-2 (2001)), and that the vehicle at issue in this case was left in a car lot. Id.
113. Id. 9113, 73 P.3d at 188 (citing Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977)).
114. Id.
115. Id. 9 14-32, 73 P.3d at 188-94.
116. Id. 9114, 73 P.3d at 188 (quoting Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389) (alteration in original).
117. 71 N.M. 329, 378 P.2d 370 (1963), overruledby Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 73 P.3d 181.
118. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, 1 16, 73 P.3d at 189 (citing Bouldin, 71 N.M. at 330, 378 P.2d at 371).
119. Id.(citing Bouldin, 71 N.M. at 330,378 P.2d at 371). The Bouldin court articulated the issue as whether
"the owner of a car who leaves it unattended and without removing the key... [is] liable for injuries to persons and
property suffered when the car is hit after its having been abandoned on the highway by a thief who stole it." Id.
(quoting Bouldin, 71 N.M. at 331, 378 P.2d at 371) (alterations in original). While Bouldin framed the question
as one of proximate cause, the Herreracourt explained that Bouldin was more appropriately viewed as a duty case.
Id. 9 17-18, 73 P.3d at 189-90. The Herreracourt reasoned that New Mexico tort law had developed a "finer
distinction" between duty and proximate cause since the time of Bouldin. Id. Moreover, the court said, Bouldin's
discussion of policy, its analysis of the same statute, and its quotation from Prosser (who said that the real question
when subsequent tortfeasors are involved is duty and not causation) all pointed toward an analysis of duty, rather
than proximate cause. Id. A reading of Bouldin, however, brings the court's conclusion into question-after quoting
Prosser, the Bouldin court explained that, "[b]e this as it may, we are clear that our decisions proceed on a theory
of causal connection." Bouldin, 71 N.M. at 334, 378 P.2d at 373. Moreover, several New Mexico cases have
characterized Bouldin as a decision based on proximate cause. See, e.g., Calkins, 110 N.M. at 65 n.6, 792 P.2d at
42 n.6; F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697,700,594 P.2d 745,748 (1979); Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769,775,
427 P.2d 655, 659 (1967); Sarracino v. Martinez, 117 N.M. 193, 196, 870 P.2d 155, 158 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
120. See infra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
122. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, 1 15, 73 P.3d at 188.
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After overruling Bouldin, the court began its common law duty analysis by
examining whether the particular plaintiffs were foreseeable to the defendant, so
that a duty could be imposed. 123 The court reiterated that New Mexico has long
required that plaintiffs be foreseeable if a duty is to be imposed: "[A] negligent
actor only owes a duty to those whose injuries are a foreseeable result of the
negligence."'' 24 Requiring foreseeability, the court said, ensures that defendants will
not be held liable for events that they "would not reasonably anticipate as likely to
happen."'' 25 But the court cautioned in a footnote that policy is the "overarching
question" in the duty determination and that, as such, it can "trump" foreseeability26
and preclude imposing a duty even in cases where the plaintiff was foreseeable.
The court noted that the foreseeability determination in this case was complicated
by the fact that the harm was directly caused not by the defendant car dealership,
but by Garcia, who stole the car and collided with the plaintiffs. 27 Generally, the
court said, there is no duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third parties,
28
unless a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Another exception to the general rule, the court noted, can be invoked when the
defendant should have known that he or she was creating a situation where a third
criminal acts." 29
party "might avail himself or herself of the opportunity to commit
130
The court determined that this case fit into that exception.

123. Id. 11 19-25, 73 P.3d at 190-92.
124. Id. 120, 73 P.3d at 190. The court contrasted this view with Judge Andrews' view from Palsgrafthat
a duty is owed to anyone who is injured in fact as a result of negligent conduct. Id. (quoting Palsgraf,162 N.E.
at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
125. Id. (quoting Bogart v. Hester, 66 N.M. 311,316, 347 P.2d 327, 330 (1959)).
126. Id. 9120, 73 P.3d at 190 n.2 (citing Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 572, 829 P.2d 645, 651
(1992) (Ransom, J., specially concurring)). The court also acknowledged without comment that modem scholars
often treat foreseeability as a question of proximate cause, rather than one of duty. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002)).

127. Id. 21,73 P.3d at 191.
128. Id. (citing Ciup v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 1996-NMSC-062, 915, 928 P.2d 263, 265).
129. Id. (citing Sarracino,117 N.M. at 195, 870 P.2d at 157).
130. Id. The court also noted that in Bouldin the actions of the car thief were found to be an independent
intervening cause that relieved the defendant of liability. Id. 123, 73 P.3d at 191-92 (citing Bouldin, 71 N.M. at
333, 378 P.2d at 373). An independent intervening cause, the court said, is "a cause which interrupts the natural
sequence of events, turns aside their cause, prevents the natural and probable results of the original act or omission,
and produces a different result, that could not have been reasonably foreseen." Id. (quoting Torres v. El Paso Elec.
Co., 1999-NMSC-029, 987 P.2d 386). According to the court, independent intervening cause is "closely related
to proximate cause." Id. But, the court said, because the doctrine concerns "question[s] of policy, foreseeability,
and remoteness," and because it serves to limit "otherwise.. .boundless liability," it is sometimes better discussed
as part of the duty (rather than proximate cause) analysis. Id. (citing Braun v. New Hope Township, 646 N.W.2d
737, 740 (S.D. 2002)). In Torres v. El PasoElectric Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court largely abolished the
practice of instructing juries on the doctrine of independent intervening cause, because it was found to be
inconsistent with comparative negligence. 1999-NMSC-029, 1 15, 987 P.2d 386, 393. Independent intervening
cause acts as a complete defense-because the chain of causation is severed, the original tortfeasor is relieved of
all liability. Id. 1 17, 987 P.2d at 393. The El Paso Electric Co. court allowed the continuing use of jury
instructions on independent intervening cause when several types of subsequent causes, including subsequent
criminal acts of third parties, are involved. Id. 1 15, 987 P.2d at 393 n.2. Herreranoted that the El PasoElectric
Co. court, in its discussion of criminal acts that can constitute an independent intervening cause, had cited Bouldin.
Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 1 23, 73 P.3d at 192 n.3. The Herreracourt overruled El Paso Electric Co. to the
extent that El Paso Electric Co. reaffirmed Bouldin's holding that the acts of the car thief were an independent
intervening cause. Id. While the Herreracourt did not explicitly say that the acts of the thief in Herrerawere not
an independent intervening cause, this overruling necessarily implies that the court did not consider the theft to be
an independent intervening cause, at least as that doctrine relates to duty. The court noted, however, that it was not
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Citing the statistics on car theft, 3 ' the court held that the plaintiffs were
foreseeable: "Plaintiffs... have persuaded us that the theft of a car left unattended
and unlocked with the key in the ignition is a natural event which can be foreseen
by the tortfeasor, as is the subsequent accident and resulting injuries. Defendant's
acts foreseeably created a zone of danger, which included Plaintiffs."' 32 The court
reiterated that Bouldin was outdated-while the theft of a car and the resulting
injuries might not have been foreseeable at the time of
Bouldin, the plaintiffs'
33
statistics showed that such events are foreseeable now.
After concluding that the plaintiffs were in fact foreseeable, the court considered
whether policy supported imposing a common law duty.' 34 In holding that New
Mexico policy did support the imposition of a duty, the court relied primarily on the
adoption of comparative fault,135 the purpose of which is to "hold[] all parties fully
responsible for their own respective acts."' 36
The court felt that the motivating factor in the Bouldin court's refusal to impose
liability was the fact that New Mexico used joint and several liability at that time:
"The implicit fear in Bouldin may very well have been the clearly troublesome
notion of holding a car owner completely responsible for the negligent or criminal
actions of a third party because of joint and several liability."'' 37 The adoption of
both comparative fault and several liability, the court explained, alleviated that fear
and rendered Bouldin "a mere remnant of an abandoned doctrine.' ' t38 Finally, the
court clarified that if the plaintiffs prevailed in proving all the elements of
addressing "the myriad number of scenarios in which a criminal act might be an independent intervening cause."
Id.
131. Id. 24, 73 P.3d at 192; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
132. Id.
133. Id. 25, 73 P.2d at 192.
134. Id. 26-32, 73 P.3d at 192-94.
135. The court made several statements that lead to the conclusion that it considered comparative fault to
be the primary reason that Bouldin should be overruled. "We conclude that a change in our law warrants the
recognition of a legal duty." Id. 26, 73 P.3d at 192. "We hold that New Mexico's adoption of comparative
negligence is a significant development in a principle of law that results in the analysis in Bouldin becoming a mere
remnant of an abandoned doctrine." Id. 1 27, 73 P.3d at 193. "[A] duty of ordinary care would be consistent with
contemporary notions of public policy, most importantly, comparative fault." Id. 31, 73 P.3d at 194. "We are
confident that public policy supports the imposition of a duty of care in this class of cases, especially considering
the adoption of comparative fault." Id.
136. Id. 27, 73 P.3d at 193 (quoting Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 690, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1981)
(alteration in original)). Prior to 1981, New Mexico was a contributory negligence jurisdiction. Scott, 96 N.M. at
685-86, 634 P.2d at 1237-38. Under contributory negligence, a plaintiff whose own negligence contributed,
however slightly, to his or her injuries could not recover anything from any defendant. Id. In Scott v. Rizzo, the New
Mexico Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of pure comparative fault, which holds that a plaintiff may recover
the amount of his or her damages that is proportional to the defendant's degree of fault. Id. at 688-89, 634 P.2d
at 1240-41.
Similarly, before Scott, New Mexico used a system of joint and several liability, which dictated that,
where more than one defendant was at fault, each could be required to pay all of the plaintiffs damages. Bartlett
v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 154, 646 P.2d 597, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). Shortly after Scott was
decided, the New Mexico courts abolished joint and several liability and replaced it with several liability. Bartlett,
98 N.M. at 159,646 P.2d at 586.Under several liability, where more than one defendant is at fault, each defendant
is liable only for the portion of the plaintiff's total damages that corresponds to that defendant's degree of fault.
Id.
137. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 1 26,73 P.3d at 193. The court further clarified that New Mexico cases have
explicitly held that negligent tortfeasors may reduce their percentage of fault by showing that another party caused
harm intentionally. Id. 1 28, 73 P.3d at 193 (citing Barth v. Coleman, 118 N.M. 1, 3,878 P.2d 319, 321 (1994)).
138. Id. 1 27, 73 P.3d at 193.
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negligence, the jury should be instructed to determine the percentage of fault
attributable to Garcia, and to apportion damages accordingly.' 39
The defendant raised several additional arguments relating to both policy and
foreseeability, 4 ° but the court summarily rejected most of these arguments, reiterating its holding that the circumstances of the case supported a finding that the
plaintiff was foreseeable,
and that the risk created by the defendant's actions was
"unreasonable." 14' However, the court did address one of the defendant's policy
arguments-the potential burden that would result from imposing a duty in this
case.'42 The court noted that it would be unreasonable to require persons in possession of vehicles to take "all conceivable security measures" that might prevent the
type of harm incurred by the plaintiffs. 143 But, the court said, finding for the plaintiff
on the issue of duty did not impose an unreasonable burden on potential defendants:
We believe that the relatively simple act of removing the key from the vehicle
or not leaving the vehicle unattended or unlocked while the key is in the ignition
is not overly burdensome and would benefit both the owner and the general
public by helping to deter theft and ensuing accidents. 44
The court concluded by noting that without any one of the factual circumstances
surrounding the state in which the defendant
left the vehicle, the theft and resulting
45
harm would not have been foreseeable.1
Justice Bosson "concur[red] fully in both the reasoning and the result" of the
opinion, '46 viewing the case as a correct application, and possible extension, of New
Mexico law. 47 He wrote separately to discuss the continuing viability of the
Palsgrafforeseeable-plaintiff doctrine.148 Some critics, Justice Bosson noted, have
accused the New Mexico courts of "using the foreseeable plaintiff 'as a legal fiction
for restricting or expanding liability."' 49 Remarking that "[plerhaps our critics are

139. Id. 1 29, 73 P.3d at 193.
140. id. 30, 73 P.3d at 193-94. The defendant argued that the following factors should be considered:
the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury from the wrongful act, the closeness of the
connection between the wrongful acts and the plaintiff's injuries, the moral blameworthiness
of the wrongful act, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on potential defendants,
the consequences to the community from the imposition of a new duty, and the availability and
cost of insurance against the risk of harm.
Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. ld.
145. Id. 32, 73 P.3d at 194. In a brief section concluding the opinion, the court disposed of the parties'
arguments relating to the other elements of negligence. Id. t 33-35, 73 P.3d 194-95. The court held that, with duty
established, it would be for the fact finder to determine whether the defendant had in fact breached that duty by
failing to exercise reasonable care. Id. 1 33, 73 P.3d at 195. Finally, the court held that proximate cause could not
be determined as a matter of law: "While we agree with Defendant that there is not great closeness in the connection
between Defendant's wrongful acts and the resulting injuries.. .we do not believe that the connection is so tenuous
that we must conclude, as a matter of law, that there is no proximate cause." Id. 134, 73 P.3d at 195.
146. Id. 39, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
147. Id.
148. Id. In 39-40, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
149. Id. 40, 73 P.3d at 196 (quoting Desiderio, supra note 39, at 585).
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right,"' 5 ° Justice Bosson noted that prior courts had considered reexamining
the
52
doctrine, but because they failed to actually do so,' the "query lingers."'
Justice Bosson asserted that some of the confusion regarding foreseeability stems
from the fact that the term is used in determining not only duty, but also breach and
causation. 153 Justice Bosson suggested that "[p]erhaps the better question for the
court should be 'unforeseeability;' that is, whether no reasonablejury could find the
injury foreseeable with respect to the plaintiff."' 154 He reiterated Justice Ransom's
pronouncement that policy is always the "overarching question" in determining
duty. 155
Citing a New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction mandating that "[e]very person
has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of the person and the property of
others,"'156 Justice Bosson suggested that perhaps Judge Andrews' view of duty is
more consistent with New Mexico tort law.' 57 The Andrews formulation, Justice
Bosson noted, avoids using foreseeability "as a surrogate for result-oriented
conclusions."' 158 Justice Bosson also recognized that the modem trend is to classify
the foreseeability of the plaintiff as an element of proximate cause rather than
duty.'59 Finally, Justice Bosson questioned whether the Palsgrafformulation is still
the best method for approaching duty: "I hope we will hear more on this issue in the
future as attitudes change toward Palsgraf'"' 6°
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Court's Statement of the Law
The court's statement of the law is rather disjointed.' 61 Instead of setting forth a
concise framework of the law it proposes to apply to the facts of the case, the court
presents a patchwork of quotes from other cases. 162 Rather than explaining the
difference between foreseeability in the context of duty and foreseeability in the
context of proximate cause, 163 the court only offers the conclusory statement that
one is a question of law and the other is a question of fact."6 This statement only

150.

Id.

151. Id. (citing Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 569, 829 P.2d 645,648(1992)).
152. Id.
153. Id. 1 41, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J.,
specially concurring).
154.

Id.

155. Id. (citing Solon, 113 N.M. at 572-73, 829 P.2d at 651-52 (Ransom, J., specially concurring)).
156. Id. 1 42, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring) (quoting UJI 13-1604 NMRA 2003).
157. Id.
158.

Id.

159. Id. 43, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J.,
specially concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYsIcAL HARM § 6 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002)).

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. 44, 73 P.3d at 197 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
See Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 1 6-10, 73 P.3d at 185-87.
This section is five paragraphs long and contains eighteen quotes and twenty-four citations, Id.
Id. 18,73P.3dat 186.

164.

Id.
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' but
establishes whether the judge or the jury will decide the respective questions 65
fails to explain any substantive difference between the two.' 66
Moreover, the court blurs the concepts of policy and foreseeability. For example,
the court suggests that a plaintiff's foreseeability, in itself, may supply good policy
support for imposing a duty: "[I]t must be determined that the injured party was a
foreseeable plaintiff...as a matter of law by the judge, using established legal
policy."' 67 It is unclear, however, how "policy" is to be used in the foreseeability
prong of the test, because foreseeability is largely a factual inquiry.'6 8
While the explanation of duty law is not a model of clarity, the court eventually
reaches a correct statement of New Mexico law-that the most important question
is whether the defendant has an obligation to which the law will give "effect and
recognition," as measured by the foreseeability of the plaintiff and New Mexico
policy, both of which are to be decided by the court as a matter of law.' 69 The
primary significance of this statement is its implication that the Torres
holding' 7 -the foreseeability of the plaintiff should be a jury question unless the
plaintiff was unforeseeable as a matter of law-will no longer be followed.' 7'
Instead, the Herreracourt signals that foreseeability should always be decided as
a matter of law, thereby reverting back to the Calkins rule.' 72 The court created
one of two possible
confusion, however, by not acknowledging that it was choosing
73
methods, both supported by existing New Mexico law.

165. Id.
166. Courts sometimes refer to an issue as a "question of law" because they would prefer to answer it
themselves rather than allow a jury to answer it. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted this phenomenon, stating that
the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been,
to say the least, elusive... .Perhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the practical
truth that the decision to label an issue a "question of law," a "question of fact," or a "mixed
question of law and fact" is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis.
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985). In fact, as Justice Bosson points out in his special concurrence,
New Mexico courts have been accused of deeming foreseeability a "question of law," in order to use it to shape
liability as they see fit. Herrera, 40, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring) (quoting Desiderio, supra
note 39, at 585).
167. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 10, 73 P.3d at 187 (quoting Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38).
168. In Calkins, Justice Ransom argued that foreseeability is a question of fact. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 67, 792
P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Calkins majority described the foreseeable plaintiff test as a
question of whether the plaintiff was "within the zone of danger" created by the defendant's act. Id. at 61,792 P.2d
at 38. This determination seems to depend on the facts of the case, including considerations of time, space, and the
parties' status and conduct. For a full discussion of the argument that foreseeability is a question of fact, see infra
Part VI.D.
169. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 10, 73 P.3d at 187.
170. Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390; see supranote 82 and accompanying text.
171. Apparently, there were no New Mexico Supreme Court cases in between Torres and Herrera that
addressed the question of whether the court or the fact finder should determine the foreseeability of the plaintiff.
There were several New Mexico Court of Appeals cases after Torres that held it to be a jury question. See, e.g.,
Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 140, 909 P.2d 14, 21 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Torres
for the proposition that "[f]oreseeability... is a question of law only when a court, 'in reviewing whether a duty
exists, can determine that the victim was unforeseeable to any reasonable mind"'); Davis v. Bd. of County
Commr's of Dona Ana County, 1999-NMCA- 110, 21,987 P.2d 1172, 1180 ("We emphasize that ultimately the
question of foreseeability will be for the jury to decide.").
172. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,
19-25, 73 P.3d at 190-92.
173. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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B. The Court's Refusal to Impose a Statutory Duty
The Herreracourt began its analysis by rejecting the New Mexico statute the
plaintiffs relied on as a basis for duty. The court's use of statutory authority as the
starting point of the duty analysis demonstrates the court's structural allegiance to
the framework mandated by Calkins 174 and clarified by Torres:'75 as those cases
require, the court did not proceed to conduct an independent policy analysis until
after it had examined the statute.' 76 The court's discussion of "statutory duty" 177 is
thus analogous to the "affirmative" duty described by Calkins. The court's refusal
to recognize an affirmative duty based on the statute is logical. It would seem
absurd to hold that the legislature intended to make a policy statement that would
support imposing a tort duty and yet specifically disallowed
use of the statute as
78
evidence in tort cases arising out of vehicle theft.
By ending its inquiry into the legislative policies underlying the statute at this
point, 179 however, the court avoided considering the statute's possible negative
policy implications. In other words, the court only examined whether the statute
supported imposing a duty, but failed to inquire whether the policy behind the
statute counseled against imposing a duty. While the statute's limiting provision
may have been intended only to preclude use of the statute to show negligence per
se,180 the limiting provision may also imply legislative disapproval of civil liability
under circumstances like those present in this case.18 ' Because both of these
interpretations are possible, the court should have addressed the possible negative
implications of the statute.
An examination of past New Mexico duty cases'8 2 shows that courts have
frequently examined the legislative policies implied by statutes, even when those
statutes do not explicitly speak to the imposition of a duty. In Lester v. Hall,183 for
example, the court ruled that New Mexico policy did not support imposing a duty

174. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
176. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 14, 73 P.3d at 188.
177. Id. 9 11-13, 73 P.3d at 187-88.
178. As the New Mexico Supreme Court has noted, "The interpretation of a statute must be consistent with
the legislature's intent and must be accomplished by 'adopting a construction which will not render the statute's
application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust."' City of Las Cruces v. Garcia, 102 N.M. 25, 26-27,690 P.2d 1019,
1020-21 (1984) (quoting State v. Santillanes, 99 N.M. 89, 90, 654 P.2d 542, 543 (1982)).
179. In the section of the opinion entitled "Whether Defendant Owed Plaintiffs a Common Law Duty," which
comprises the majority of the rest of the opinion, the court does not cite or refer to the statute. Herrera, 2003NMSC-018, (H 14-32, 73 P.3d at 188-94.
180. Negligence per se is a tool whereby a plaintiff may establish the defendant's negligence as a matter of
law by showing three elements: (1) the defendant violated a statute that prohibits certain conduct, (2) the plaintiff
is a member of the class of persons that the statute was enacted to protect, and (3) the harm incurred was of the type
that the statute was intended to prevent. McEthannon v. Ford, 2003-NMCA-091,
32, 73 P.3d 827, 835. The
limiting provision in the statute clearly prevents its use in showing negligence per se-if a plaintiff may not
introduce evidence that the statute was violated, he or she obviously cannot use it to prove negligence per se.
181. The court did not explicitly address this possibility and, apparently, the defendant did not raise it.
However, by concluding that the statute did not support the imposition of a duty, and by then proceeding to impose
a common law duty, the court necessarily implied that the statute did not preclude it from taking this second step.
182. See, e.g., Lester v. Hall, 1998-NMSC-047,970 P.2d 590; Norwest Bank N.M., N.A. v. Chrysler Corp.,
1999-NMCA-070, 981 P.2d 1215; see also Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133,909 P.2d 14 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1995).
183. 1998-NMSC-047, 970 P.2d 590.
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on a physician whose patient injured a third party after the physician had
negligently prescribed drugs to the patient.'84 The court relied on New Mexico
statutes that carefully limit physician liability by imposing a shorter than usual
statute of limitations,'85 providing caps on damages,' 86 and requiring that cases be
submitted to a medical review commission prior to trial. 187 In view of these
legislative policies, the court declined to hold that a duty was owed, concluding that
its authority to do so had to be "exercised sparingly."'' 88 This deference to legislative
policy is remarkable given that the statutes relied upon provided no specific
pronouncement on physician liability to third parties, but only showed a general
legislative policy of circumscribing recovery against physicians.
Another recent case, Norwest Bank New Mexico v. Chrysler Corp.,189 explicitly
demonstrates the deference given to statements of legislative policy by New Mexico
courts in determining tort duty. Norwest Bank New Mexico affirmed that the socalled "seat-belt defense," where a defendant shows that the plaintiff was
comparatively negligent in failing to wear a seat-belt, cannot be used in New
Mexico. 9 ° The court noted that a New Mexico statute, the Safety Belt Use Act,
stated that seat-belt use was mandatory for front seat vehicle occupants. ' The Act
included a limiting provision stating that failure to wear a seat-belt as required by
the Act "shall not in any instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not limit
or apportion damages.' 9 2 Specially concurring, Judge Hartz believed that the
statute's limiting provision was only intended to preclude using the statute to show
negligence per se, but that the judiciary was still free to develop a common law rule
that failure to wear a seat-belt constitutes admissible evidence of comparative
negligence on the part of plaintiffs.' 93 The Norwest Bank New Mexico majority
rejected this interpretation, holding instead that the provision not only precluded
negligence per se, but also specifically disallowed the admission of any evidence
relating to seat-belt use.' 94 Because the legislature had already spoken, the majority
was unwilling to enact a common law rule that it felt would circumvent the legislative policy expressed in the statute. t95
There are parallels between Judge Hartz' position in Norwest Bank New Mexico
and the position of the Herreracourt.196 In Norwest Bank New Mexico, Judge Hartz

184. Id. 1 11, 970 P.2d at 593-94.
185. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976)).
186. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 41-5-6 (1992)).
187. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 41-5-15 (1976)).
188. Id.
189. 1999-NMCA-070, 981 P.2d 1215.
190. Id. 1 26, 981 P.2d at 1223-24 (quoting Mott v. Sun County Garden Prods., 120 N.M. 261, 267, 901
P.2d 192, 198 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)).
191. Id. 25, 981 P.2d at 1223 (citing NMSA 1978, § 66-7-373(A) (1985)).
192. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 66-7-373(A) (1985)).
193. Id. N 57, 75, 981 P.2d at 1231, 1234 (Hartz, J., specially concurring).
194. Id. 1 26, 981 P.2d at 1223-24.
195. Id. 1 29, 981 P.2d at 1224.
196. Admittedly, allowing a seat-belt defense may present more difficulties than imposing a duty in this case.
For example, damages are difficult to apportion in enhanced injury cases. Id. 64, 981 P.2d at 1232 (Hartz, J.,
specially concurring). Moreover, the language in the seat-belt statute provides especially strong support for the
argument that the legislature intended to disallow presentation of any evidence of the conduct that the statute
prohibits: the Safety Belt Use Act clearly states that failure to wear a seat-belt is not apportionable negligence. Id.
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argued that allowing seat-belt evidence would not constitute a major change in the
law, but would simply hold plaintiffs responsible for exercising ordinary care for
their own safety, which is already required by New Mexico law. 197 In Herrera,the
court's argument is similar: defendants do not have a duty to the world at large, or
a duty to protect plaintiffs from the criminal acts of third parties; rather they must
only exercise ordinary care under the circumstances, as New Mexico law already
requires.,9
The point, however, is not whether imposing a duty would constitute a major
change in the law or simply require defendants to exercise ordinary care. Here, as
with the seat-belt defense examined in Norwest Bank New Mexico, there is a
possibility that the legislature has already spoken, and that the courts should not
enact a common law rule that conflicts with the legislative policy expressed in a
statute. Because it is difficult to determine the exact contours of the legislature's
intent in adding the provision that disallows mention of the statute in civil actions,
the court should have at least examined the possibility that the limiting provision
represents a legislative policy that the conduct prohibited by the statute should not
be a basis for civil liability.
C. The Court'sAnalysis of Common Law Duty
After determining that the statute did not provide a basis for imposing a duty, the
court proceeded to examine "common law duty,"' 99 which is analogous to Calkins'
"defensive" duty. While this sequence demonstrates continued structural adherence
to Calkins and Torres,2 °° the substance of the court's analysis departs from both
cases in two ways. First, the court determined foreseeability as a matter of law,20 '
in contravention of the Torres holding that foreseeability is for the jury unless it is
absent as a matter of law.2 °2 Second, the court required less policy support to impose
a duty than past cases suggest would be necessary.2 3 Thus, while the Calkinsi
Torres structure remains intact, Herrera changes the method of analysis that is to
be used within that structure.
Because the choice to conduct a full foreseeability analysis is in direct opposition
to the Torres holding, 2°4 it is remarkable that, in finding the plaintiffs foreseeable,
the Herreracourt never cited Torres. Prior to Herrera,there were arguably two
125, 981 P.2d at 1223 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 66-7-373(A) (1985)). The statute at issue in Herreramerely states
that evidence of the statute itself will not be admissible in civil actions. See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
197. Norwest Bank, 1999-NMCA-070, 68, 981 P.2d at 1232 (Hartz, J., specially concurring) (quoting UJI
13-604 NMRA 1999).
198. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,1 31, 73 P.3d at 194 ("Our holding is not that Defendant owes an unlimited
duty to the world or a duty to actually prevent the criminal actions of a third party; Defendant owes a duty of
ordinary care to foreseeable plaintiffs.").
199. Id. H 14-32, 73 P.3d at 188-94.
200. The quote from Torres shows that the court was deliberate in recognizing that this second step should
be taken only after legislative policy has been examined. Id. 1 14,73 P.3d at 188 (quoting Torres, 119 N.M. at 612,
894 P.2d at 389) ("Courts should make policy in order to determine duty only when the body politic has not spoken
and only with the understanding that any misperception of the public mind may be corrected shortly by the
[L]egislature.") (alteration in original).
201. See id. 124, 73 P.3d at 192.
202. Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
203. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
204. See Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
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methods that a court could use in analyzing foreseeability: (1) the Calkins approach,
in which the foreseeability of the plaintiff is always a question of law for the courts
to determine,2" 5 and (2) the Torres approach, in which the foreseeability of the
plaintiff is determined by the fact finder, unless the plaintiff is unforeseeable as a
matter of law.2 °6 While these two holdings are inconsistent with one another, the
Torres court did not explicitly overrule Calkins.2 °7 Thus, although Torres was the
more recent pronouncement on the issue, both of these strains of foreseeability
analysis were arguably still viable when Herrerawas decided.
Without overruling Torres, and without signaling that it was choosing one of two
possible approaches, the Herreracourt has apparently reverted back to the Calkins
rule that foreseeability of the plaintiff is always a question for the court.20 8 Thus,
much as Torres did, Herreraseems to have shifted the balance of power between
the court and the fact finder, but, as in Torres, the shift was obscured by the court's
failure to acknowledge the road not taken.
As for the substance of the court's foreseeability analysis, it is difficult to
critically evaluate-either one agrees that the plaintiffs were foreseeable, or one
does not. 20 9 The court seems to have been persuaded primarily by the plaintiffs'
expert affidavits: after the initial recitation of the statistics in the fact section of the
opinion, the court cites the statistics five more times throughout the remainder of
the opinion. 210 The fact that the court gives no other justification for its holding that
the plaintiffs were foreseeable indicates that it based its decision primarily on the
statistics.
One procedural matter calls into question the propriety of the court's focus on the
expert testimony. The district court dismissed the case on a Rule 1-012(B)(6)
motion.2"' Because the plaintiffs submitted additional material (the expert affidavit)
to the district court, the supreme court reviewed the district court's decision as it
would review a decision on a motion for summary judgment.212 In its brief to the
supreme court, the defendant strongly criticized the expert affidavit." 3 However,
based on the plaintiffs' briefs, it appears that the defendant did not challenge the
affidavit before the district court.2" 4 Presumably such an objection would have been

205. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39; see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
206. Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 87.
208. This reversion is demonstrated by the fact that the court chose to determine that the plaintiff was
foreseeable,a result that would not occur under Torres.See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral ofMacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REa.
1733, 1776 (1998) ("What one court finds unforeseeable as a matter of law, another court will find foreseeable as
a matter of law."); James R. Adams, From Babel to Reason: An Examinationof the Duty Issue, 31 MCGEORGE L.
REv. 25, 47 (1999) ("The test of foreseeability is very subjective.").
210. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,
15, 22, 24, 30, 32, 73 P.3d at 188-89, 191, 192, 194.
211. Id. 11, 73 P.3d at 185.
212. Id. 4, 73 P.3d at 185.
213. The defendant referred to the expert affidavit as "untested, unsupported and self-serving," and claimed
that it "present[ed] a myriad of suspect conclusions." Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief at 4, Herrera v. Quality
Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, 73 P.3d 181 (No. 26,946).
214. The plaintiffs alleged that "Defendant.. .has conveniently discounted its own failure to have filed a
Motion to Strike, or refuted or challenged any of [the expert's] statements at the trial level." Plaintiff-Appellants'
Reply Brief at 4, Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-0 18, 73 P.3d 181 (No. 26,946). The New Mexico Rules
of Civil Procedure make clear that the defendant could have challenged the statistics had it requested the
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waived if it were not raised below.21 5 While the supreme court accepted the expert's
data as true, 21 6 it is unclear whether the court considered the possibility that the
statistics were inaccurate, because it made no reference to a challenge to the
statistics at any level of the proceedings, or to the defendant having waived its
argument on their reliability. Regardless of the procedural details of this case, the
fact remains that the court made a significant change in the law by creating a duty
under novel circumstances, based largely on an unchallenged expert affidavit.
Because imposing a duty in this case has important ramifications not only for
these parties, but also for future litigants, it might have been preferable to take a
more cautious approach and remand the case for further proceedings to determine
the reliability of the statistics.2t 7 Instead, future litigants will have to challenge the
statistical evidence on car theft. If the statistics are found to be inaccurate, appeal
to the New Mexico Supreme Court will likely be necessary, because lower courts
might not be willing to speculate on whether the supreme court would have found
the plaintiffs in this case foreseeable in the absence of the statistical data.
Moreover, some of the statistics refer to the Albuquerque metropolitan area,
while others apparently refer to the nation as a whole.21 8 The question of the
foreseeability of vehicle theft and subsequent harm in, for example, a small, rural
community with a lower crime rate, might differ significantly from the question of
whether these events are foreseeable in Albuquerque.2 19 Herrera,however, creates
a precedent for the state of New Mexico as a whole that a duty should be imposed
under these circumstances. Even in cases that are factually distinguishable, Herrera
may prove a difficult hurdle to overcome because the court did nothing to limit its
holding to metropolitan areas.
After using the statistics to determine that the plaintiffs were foreseeable, the
court proceeded to conduct a defensive or common law duty policy analysis.
Despite the court's continued acknowledgement of and adherence to the Calkinsi
Torres framework, and the deference to established policy mandated by that framework,"2 the substance of the court's policy analysis represents a departure from
opportunity to do so. Rule 1-012 states that, if matters outside the pleadings are submitted, "all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent...by Rule 1-056." Rule 1-012(B) NMRA 2003.
215. See, e.g., Chavez v. Ronquillo, 94 N.M. 442,445,612 P.2d 234,237 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that
"[i]f counsel do not object to inadmissible matters the court may consider them on the motion for summary
judgment") (citations omitted).
216. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, 4,73 P.3d at 185.
217. An example of such caution is demonstrated by Justice Ransom's special concurrence in Richardson
v. Carnegie Library Restaurant,Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 701,763 P.2d 1153, 1166 (1988). In Richardson,the court
determined the level of constitutional scrutiny to be used in equal protection challenges to statutory tort damage
caps. Because the defendant had suffered a default judgment, Justice Ransom said that he would prefer to apply
the decision only to the parties at hand, and wait until the issue had been fully briefed by two adversary parties to
establish a universal rule. Id. at 702, 763 P.2d at 1167 (Ransom, J., specially concurring).
218. See Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 3, 73 P.3d at 185.
219. For example, the Texas Supreme Court has noted that "[m]ost courts have looked to narrow geographic
areas in analyzing the foreseeability of criminal conduct... .Statistics regarding large or undefined geographic areas
do not by themselves make crime foreseeable at a specific location." Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v.
Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. 1998).
11, 73 P.3d at 187 ("[W]e first address Plaintiffs' assertion that
220. See Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018,
Defendant owed them a statutory duty.... '[It is the particular domain of the [L]egislature, as the voice of the
people, to make public policy."') (quoting Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389) (second alteration in original); see also id. 14, 73 P.3d at 188 (stating that "'[c]ourts should make policy in order to determine duty only
when the body politic has not spoken"' after finding no statutory duty and before examining common law duty)
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prior New Mexico duty cases. Aside from the adoption of comparative fault, the
court provides little policy support for its decision to impose a duty. 22 ' The court's
basic premise seems sound: with the adoption of comparative fault and several
liability there is no longer a danger of a negligent tortfeasor having to pay not only
for his or her own negligence but also for the negligent or criminal acts of another
tortfeasor.2 22
Prior cases, however, suggest that comparative fault alone should not be considered a sufficient reason to impose a duty. Certainly past cases have presented a
much more substantial policy analysis in deciding or declining to impose a duty.223
In contrast to the affirmative policy support proffered in past cases, comparative
fault only explains why it would not be againstpublic policy to impose a duty under
these circumstances. 224 As the New Mexico Supreme Court recently warned, "the
mere 'lack of a prohibition does not constitute a mandate to create new duties or to
apply old duties in new contexts. '-225
It is debatable whether the Herreracourt overstepped the boundaries set by prior
cases. The existence of a tort duty is a matter of common law, which courts are free
to shape as they see fit in the absence of a definitive legislative statement. Still,
given the approaches employed in past cases, one would have expected more policy
support for what is arguably a significant change in New Mexico tort law. In fact,
the court's only real policy support for its decision, other than the adoption of comparative fault, is its simple observation that obligating those in possession of
vehicles not to leave them in this condition is a modest step that is likely to prevent

(quoting Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389).
221. In one paragraph, Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018,
30, 73 P.3d at 193-94, discussed supra at notes
140-144 and accompanying text, the court mentions several policy arguments presented by the defendant. With
the exception of that one paragraph, the remainder of the policy analysis focuses on comparative fault.
222. Id. 26, 73 P.3d at 192-93.
223. While both Calkins and Torresexplicitly left open the possibility that a court could impose a duty even
in the absence of any supporting legislative policy, neither case actually did so. See supranotes 55-56 and 79-81
and accompanying text. Moreover, other New Mexico duty cases have generally provided much more substantial
policy support than does Herrera.See, e.g., Blake v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 2004-NMCA-002, 921-24, 13-16,
82 P.3d 960, 966-67, 964-65 (spending four paragraphs discussing the public policy implications of holding that
a public utility owes a duty to the public to maintain streetlights, and four paragraphs discussing how other
jurisdictions have treated the same question); Sanchez v. San Juan Concrete Co., 1997-NMCA-068, 912-20,943
P.2d 571, 574-76 (providing a nine paragraph discussion of policy, drawing an analogy between the legislative
policies expressed in the New Mexico Dramshop Act and the policies behind holding that a duty is owed when a
defendant has negligently entrusted a vehicle to an intoxicated person); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121
N.M. 133, 140-41,909 P.2d 14, 21-22 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (spending five paragraphs examining New Mexico
statutes and other policy considerations, and two paragraphs discussing cases from other jurisdictions in deciding
whether to recognize a cause of action for fear of exposure to AIDS). See generally Davis v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Dona Aia County, 1999-NMCA- 110, 987 P.2d 1172 (conducting a lengthy policy analysis using New
Mexico law, cases from other jurisdictions, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
224. It should be noted that another recent New Mexico Supreme Court case calls the Calkins policy
framework into question by stating the policy component of duty in exactly this negative manner. In Lozoya v.
Sanchez, which was decided only two months prior to Herrera,the supreme court held that "[o]ur duty rule.. .asks
whether any public policy factors preclude the court from imposing a duty of care toward a foreseeable plaintiff."
2003-NMSC-009, 1 15, 66 P.3d 948, 953. In Lozoya, the court for the first time allowed the possibility for loss of
consortium recovery by unmarried cohabitants. Id. 911, 66 P.3d at 951. Thus, like Ramirez, Lozoya was not a
standard, personal injury action. It remains to be seen whether this negative duty rule will prevail in ordinary
negligence cases.
225. Gabaldon v. Erisa Mortgage Co., 1999-NMSC-039, 9127, 990 P.2d 197, 202. In Gabaldon,the court
reversed the court of appeals' decision to create a new cause of action for negligent entrustment of real property.
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harm. 226 The court did not dwell on this rationale, using it only as a means of
refuting the defendant's policy arguments, and only mentioning it after having
decided to impose a duty based on the adoption of comparative fault. This rationale
has common-sense appeal and constitutes the type of cost-benefit, public policy
analysis that many past duty cases have employed. One wonders if perhaps this was
indeed the driving force behind the court's decision, with the discussion of
comparative fault serving largely as a justification for the desired result.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. What Is the Breadth of Herrera's Holding?
The most conservative reading of the court's holding is that these particular
plaintiffs were foreseeably injured, and that comparative fault provided policy
support for imposing a duty. 227 The court gives some indication of how this holding
may be applied in future cases by saying that, absent any one of the essential facts
surrounding the theft (that the car was unattended and unlocked and that the keys
were left in the car), injury to the plaintiffs would not have been foreseeable. 28 One
wonders how seriously to take this dictum. Suppose a car owner left his or her keys
lying on the hood of the car and a thief picked them up and stole the car. Would the
duty analysis turn on the distinction that the keys were not left "in" the car? Or,
suppose the car was left in a large lot with a patrolling security guard who did not
have the car in his view. Would this be considered "unattended"?
The holding also raises questions about the nature of the defendant. The facts of
the case are very sympathetic to the plaintiffs, who were injured while obeying the
law by pulling over for a police siren.229 The defendant was a large corporate entity
engaged in the commercial automobile trade. Would the case have been decided
differently had the defendant been a private car owner who left the keys in the car
in his or her driveway while going back into the house to retrieve a forgotten item?
This would likely be a difference without a distinction. The court never mentions
in several passages, uses the terms "owner" and
the nature of the defendant, and,
"possessor" interchangeably.23 ° This language forecloses the argument that the
23
holding applies only to car dealerships and not private owners. 1

226. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 1 30, 73 P.3d at 194.
227. Id. 31, 73 P.3d at 194.
228. Id. 32, 73 P.3d at 194.
229. Id. 2, 73 P.3d at 185.
230. See, e.g., id. 32, 73 P.3d at 194 ("we conclude.. .that an owner or one in possession of a vehicle
reasonably can foresee that the vehicle might be stolen... ); id. 37, 73 P.3d at 196 ("We conclude that an owner
or one in possession of a vehicle.. owes a duty of ordinary care....").
231. One relatively weak possibility for distinguishing Herrerawould be to argue that the particular location
of the car in Herreraincreased the foreseeability that the vehicle would be stolen. Apparently, the car thief went
to the car lot specifically for the purpose of looking for items to steal that had been left in vehicles. Id. 2, 73 P.3d
at 185. Arguably, parties looking for items to steal are more likely to target a location with a large number of
vehicles, like a parking lot, than they are to target residential areas. However, if an argument like that were to
succeed, it would likely be because it distinguishes Herrera on the basis of specific temporal and spatial facts
relating to foreseeability, and does not rely merely on distinguishing a corporate defendant from a private
defendant.
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Herreraalso raises the question of how future litigants should approach the
statistics that played such a large role in the court's foreseeability analysis. Herrera
appears to create a precedent for the whole state of New Mexico. 23 2 Because the
court relied so heavily on the statistics in finding that the plaintiffs were foreseeable, 23 ' attorneys litigating in smaller communities should attempt to obtain specific
statistics for the relevant community and, if possible, distinguish Herrera by
arguing that a lower crime rate makes vehicle theft less foreseeable. Moreover,
because the statistics were not challenged, 2 4 future litigants in any New Mexico
community may want to attempt to show that they were inaccurate, and that,
because Herrera relied so heavily on the statistics, the case would have been
resolved differently in their absence.
B. Is ForeseeabilityAlways a Questionfor the Court Now?
By holding that the plaintiffs were foreseeable as a matter of law, 235 the Herrera
court apparently shifted the balance of power with respect to the foreseeability
analysis back to the courts. While the court was explicit as to this holding, it failed
to note that its course of action was in direct opposition to Torres.236 Because
Herreradid not overrule Torres, attorneys may want to argue that Torres is still
good law, and that the foreseeability of the plaintiff should thus be a jury question.
Conversely, attorneys may want to argue that Herreraimplicitly overruled Torres
on this point, and that foreseeability must now be decided by the court in every
instance.
With its holding that the foreseeability of the plaintiff is to be decided as a matter
of law, the court has apparently reestablished a tool for the judiciary to use in ruling
on early termination motions in negligence actions. Between Torres and Herrera,
all of the elements of a negligence action, with the exception of the policy
component of duty, would usually have been decided by the jury. In other words,
a court could rule on these questions (foreseeability, breach of duty, causation, and
damages) as a matter of law only if reasonable minds could not disagree on the
conclusion to be reached. 237 Now that Herrerahas reestablished that foreseeability
is always a question of law in the duty context, courts may dismiss claims merely
by holding that a plaintiff has failed to show that he or she was a foreseeable victim,
without having to make the more difficult finding that "reasonable minds could not
disagree" on the issue. Conversely, as the Herreracourt itself did, courts may rule
that a particular plaintiff was foreseeable, thereby saving the plaintiff the trouble of
convincing a jury on the issue. While it remains to be seen whether plaintiffs or
defendants are more likely to benefit in the long run from the courts' newly
232. See supra notes 218-219 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 210 and accompanying text, noting how the court cited the statistics five times.
234. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
235. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 24, 73 P.3d at 192.
236. See Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
237. See, e.g., Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 141, 909 P.2d 14, 22 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995) ("[Tlhe only instance in which summary judgment could be granted.. is (1) where no reasonable mind could

find that this Plaintiff, the event, or her injury were foreseeable; (2) where no reasonable mind could conclude that
Defendant breached its duty to Plaintiff; or (3) where no reasonable mind could conclude that Defendant's breach
proximately caused Plaintiff's damages.").
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reclaimed ability to rule on foreseeability as a matter of law, Herrera clearly
represents a major shift in power from juries to the courts on the issue of
foreseeability.
C. Does the Court's Comparative Fault Analysis Createa Slippery Slope?
The court seems to have required a weaker showing of policy support than past
cases suggested would be necessary. 238 Apparently the court will still look to
statutes as the primary source of policy authority, 239 but in the absence of legislative
support, the court may be more willing to expand the category of policies that will
support imposing a duty.2 ° Moreover, the Herreracourt was willing to sidestep the
question of the statute's possible negative implications.2 41 Defense attorneys should
be extra vigilant in analyzing statutes for such negative implications, because the
court appears not to recognize an independent duty to conduct this type of analysis.
Rather, the court appears willing to enact common law rules that arguably conflict
with statutory policies, at least if such conflicts are not specifically argued.
Further, the court's policy analysis with respect to comparative fault has the
potential to be applicable in many other factual settings. The analysis is not specific
to the facts of the case and could likely be applied almost without alteration to any
fact set that involves third-party tortfeasors. The Herreracourt arguably viewed
comparative fault as a major change in the law that might merit reexamination of
precedent in any circumstance where, under joint and several liability, the
disproportionate fault of multiple tortfeasors may have discouraged prior courts
from imposing a duty on the "lesser" tortfeasor. Because it is unclear where this
slippery slope might level off, plaintiffs' attorneys should continue to think of
creative ways to argue that the adoption of comparative fault justifies expansions
in duty, and perhaps even liability in general, and defense attorneys should be
prepared with strong, preferably statutory, policy arguments for why a duty should
not be imposed.
D. Should ForeseeabilityContinue to Be Consideredin the Duty Analysis, or
Should New Mexico Courts Decide to "Call a Spade a Spade"?
Justice Bosson's special concurrence signals that at least one member of the
court is ready to reexamine New Mexico duty law. Justice Bosson seems to suggest
two possible alternatives to the current duty analysis: (1) making foreseeability a
jury question unless it is absent as a matter of law,242 and (2) eliminating
243
foreseeability from the duty analysis altogether and basing duty strictly on policy.

238. See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 200.
240. See supra Part V.B.
241. See id.
242. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, 1 41, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
243. See id. 41-42, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring). Strictly speaking, Justice Bosson
only suggests that perhaps Judge Andrews' view is more suited to New Mexico law. However, given Justice
Bosson's statement that "the overarching question for any court is whether issues of sound legal and social
policy... preclude imposing a duty in a particular case," id. 1 41, 73 P.3d at 196, it seems unlikely that he would
advocate a strict construction of the Andrews view, which would completely eliminate duty as an element of
negligence. Id. 11 41-42, 73 P.3d at 196.
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1. Making Foreseeability a Jury Question
First, Justice Bosson suggests that perhaps courts should only examine
"unforeseeability," or whether reasonable minds could not disagree with respect to
the conclusion that the plaintiff was not foreseeable. 2' This approach would be
consistent with Torres, because it would treat foreseeability as a required
component of duty, but a component that is usually to be addressed by the jury
rather than the court.245 The appeal of this method is that it adheres to the traditional
rule that courts answer questions of law while juries answer questions of fact.
Although New Mexico courts have almost always referred to foreseeability in the
duty context as a question of law, 21 it is more properly considered a question of fact
or a mixed question that should be answered by the jury. In Calkins, the court held
that foreseeability was a question of law, 247 and described the test as whether" the
injured party.. .was within the zone of danger created by the [defendant's]
actions., 24" The New Mexico Supreme Court later explained that in using the term
"zone of danger," the Calkins court simply meant to describe "the class of persons
that a reasonable person would conclude based on the circumstances was subject
'
to a risk by the defendant's act or omissions."249
If, as the supreme court explained,
the foreseeable plaintiff test is to be based on what a reasonable person would have
foreseen, then it should be a jury question, because "in negligence case[s], 'the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of anything is ordinarily a mixed question of
law and fact which should be determined by a jury. '250
A recent New Mexico Supreme Court case, Lozoya v. Sanchez,25' further
suggests Pat foreseeability should be a jury question. The Lozoya court held that

244. Id. 41, 73 P.3d at 196.
245. Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 1 8, 73 P.3d at 186 (quoting Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61,792 P.2d
at 38); Rutherford v. Chaves County, 2003-NMSC-010, 1 13,69 P.3d 1199, 1203 (quoting Calkins, 110 N.M. at
61,792 P.2d at 38); Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61,792 P.2d at 38; Narney v. Daniels, 115 N.M. 41, 51, 846 P.2d 347,
357 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38). One notes that if courts would prefer
to keep the foreseeability question for themselves, they would be unlikely to designate it as a "question of fact."
247. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
248. Id. Many cases have cited the zone of danger test. See, e.g., Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 8, 73 P.3d
at 187 (citing Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 1996-NMSC-049,
17, 923 P.2d 1154, 1158-59 (same); Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422,426, 872 P.2d 840, 844 (1994) (same);
Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 569, 829 P.2d 645, 648 (1992) (same); Narney v. Daniels, 115 N.M.
41, 51,846 P.2d 347,357 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 113 N.M. 736, 737,
832 P.2d 797, 798 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
249. Madrid, 1996-NMSC-049, 1 18, 923 P.2d at 1159. This interpretation would effectuate what the
Herreracourt identified as the goal behind requiring foreseeability in the duty context-making sure that a
defendant is not held responsible for "that which he [or she] would not reasonably anticipate as likely to happen."
Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,1 20, 73 P.3d at 190-91 (quoting Bogart v. Hester, 66 N.M. 311, 316, 347 P.2d 327,
330 (1959) (alteration in original)).
250. Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 142, 909 P.2d 14, 23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting W. States Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Sandia Corp., 110 N.M. 676, 680, 798 P.2d 1062, 1066 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1990)). In fact, viewed in this light, the foreseeable plaintiff question bears a strong resemblance to the jury
question of whether adefendant has breached his or her duty. In determining breach, the jury is asked to determine
whether a defendant has failed to act like a reasonably prudent person would have under the circumstances. See,
e.g., Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 650, 808 P.2d 614, 620 (1991).
251. 2003-NMSC-009, 66 P.3d 948. In Lozoya, the New Mexico Supreme Court extended the cause of action
for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants. Id. 1 17, 66 P.3d at 954.
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in order to recover for loss of consortium, a plaintiff must show that he or she
enjoyed an" intimate familial relationship" with the victim.25 2 This requirement is
necessary, the court said, because it ensures that only parties who were foreseeably
harmed by the victim being injured will be able to recover.253 The Lozoya court
further held that the existence of a close familial relationship was a question for the
jury,"' effectively delegating the foreseeability question to thejury. This delegation
is logical. Determinations based on foreseeability are more properly decided by
are the essence of what our system normally
juries, because such2 determinations
55
entrusts juries to do.
2. Eliminating Foreseeability from the Duty Analysis
Alternatively, Justice Bosson's concurrence raises the possibility of eliminating
foreseeability from the duty analysis altogether.256 This possibility represents a
modified version of Judge Andrews' view, and would mean that everyone is
presumed to owe a duty of reasonable care to the world at large regardless of
foreseeability, but policy considerations might preclude the law from recognizing
that duty. 257 The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third)of Torts advocates this
approach, suggesting that, "[i]n most cases, courts.. .need not refer to duty on a
reasons of principle
case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, in some categories of25cases,
8
or policy dictate that liability should not be imposed.
The primary advantage of this "modified Andrews" approach is that it would
eliminate a great deal of confusion, thereby giving tort law more consistency and
legitimacy. The term "foreseeability" has caused a great deal of confusion, because
it is vague and has different meanings in different contexts. 9 Since Palsgraf,the
use of foreseeability in the duty analysis has been much criticized. 260 Commentators

252. Id. 26, 66 P.3d at 957 (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. 1994)).
253. Id.
254. Id. 21,66 P.3d at 956. The Lozoya court acknowledged that, "[a]lthough imposition of a duty is a legal
question for the court, oftentimes it is dependant on a factual determination, which we entrust to the jury." Id.
(citing Sarracino v. Martinez, 117 N.M. 193, 194-95, 870 P.2d 155, 156-57 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)).
255. The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts further supports the idea that foreseeability
should be a jury question. The Restatement recommends that only "factors applicable to categories of actors or
patterns of conduct" should be considered under the rubric of duty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). If, on the other hand, "liability depends on factors
specific to an individual case," then those factors should be considered by the jury under the rubric of proximate
cause. Id. The foreseeability inquiry is clearly dependent on factors specific to each case.
256. See Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 41, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
257. Interestingly, this approach echoes the negative policy rule stated in Lozoya. See supra note 224.
258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILrrY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2002). Under this rubric, duty is no longer an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case; id. cmt. b, rather, the
defendant has the burden of raising the duty issue. Id. The Restatement argues that this burden shifting "makes
good sense," because "in the vast majority of cases the defendant owes plaintiff a duty of reasonable care." Id.,
reporter's note cmt. b.
259. For example, Calkins described the question in duty as whether the plaintiff was in the "zone of danger"
created by the negligent act, and the question in proximate cause as whether the manner of harm that occurred was
foreseeable. 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38. Foreseeability is also a consideration in the breach of duty element
and is described there as "what a reasonably prudent person would foresee." Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 111N.M.
644, 650, 808 P.2d 614, 620 (1991).
260. For example, Professor Leon Green noted in 1928 that the use of the foreseeability test in duty "seems
entirely too misleading.. even as a shorthand expression under which to subsume the numerous factors which impel
judgment." Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1031 (1928).
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have noted that foreseeability often does little more than confuse the duty analysis,
as well as the analyses of the other elements of negligence. Professors John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky suggest that
[t]he courts' uncertainty about what to do with duty is displayed in their uneven
use of the concept of foreseeability. Sometimes foreseeability is deemed part of
the issue of breach and thus left to thejury. Other times it is deemed the essence
of duty and kept for the courts. Still other times it is left for the jury under the
heading of proximate cause. What one court finds unforeseeable as a matter of
law, another court will find foreseeable as a matter of law .... Far from cleaning
up duty-analysis, the concept of foreseeability illustrates the confusion courts
"'
currently experience dealing with the duty element.26
Moreover, as Justice Bosson observed, foreseeability is often used as a "surrogate
' Another scholar has noted that "[m]ost
for result-oriented conclusions."262
courts
use foreseeability to mask the true policy considerations that justify the creation or
expansion of a cause of action. 263 Because foreseeability is such a hazy and
manipulable test, removing it from the duty analysis would further the values of
certainty and consistency, which would in turn encourage greater faith in the
judicial system.2 6
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the Herrera court explicitly denied that it was adopting Judge
Andrews' view that every person owes a duty to the world at large,265 one wonders
if that is the direction in which the law of New Mexico is headed. The Herrera
court loosened the standards required for a finding of duty in two ways. First, the
court did not require an affirmative showing of how New Mexico policy supported
a finding of duty. Second, the court was convinced on the issue of foreseeability by
the plaintiffs' persuasive if unsubstantiated statistics. This loosening of standards
may point toward eventual adoption of the modified Andrews view, which
effectively removes duty as an element of negligence in the majority of cases.
Adopting the modified Andrews approach would not necessarily be a negative
trend. Treating duty as strictly a matter of policy would eliminate a great deal of
confusion and would encourage courts to articulate the policy reasons behind their
decisions instead of hiding behind the fiction of foreseeability. Further, this
approach would not necessarily lead to the expansion of liability even in cases
where policy supported imposing a duty. In cases where a court would have found
the plaintiff unforeseeable under the Cardozo formula, there is a good chance that
under the modified Andrews approach the defendant would prevail anyway, because
the fact finder would determine either that the negligent act was not the proximate

261. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 209, at 1776.
262. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018, 42, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).
263. wiiami H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability:A Murky Crystal BailforPredictingLiability, 23 CUMB. L. REv.
349, 402 (1993).
264. See, e.g., id. ("Using foreseeability in a flexible, case-by-case analysis creates uncertainty by giving
courts the power and method to decide cases without external restraint.").
265. Herrera,2003-NMSC-018,1 31,73 P.3d at 194 ("Our holding is not that Defendant owes un unlimited
duty to the world.....
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cause of the harm, or that the duty was not breached. In this case, for example, even
though the court found that a duty was owed, the plaintiffs would still have to
convince a jury on the issues of both breach and causation. If the case were to
proceed to trial, the plaintiffs' victory would be far from certain--one imagines that
the group of readers who wrote to the Albuquerque Journalto express their outrage
at the decision 266 would be represented on the jury. Thus, loosening the duty
standard might not result in an increase in ultimate findings of liability, because
plaintiffs in cases like this would likely have difficulty convincing a jury with
respect to one or more of the other elements of negligence.
But even if relaxing the duty standard would not make much difference
academically, it could have a substantial practical impact. If the ability of the courts
to use duty as a device to find for defendants as a matter of law in the early stages
of a lawsuit is curtailed, more defendants will feel compelled to settle rather than
risk losing at trial, and when cases do go to trial, more resources will be expended
by all litigants because many cases will take longer to be resolved. Thus, while
eliminating foreseeability from the equation would further clarity, certainty, and
judicial accountability, New Mexico courts will ultimately have to decide whether
the fiction of the foreseeable plaintiff is a necessary evil.

266. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.

